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CASE NOTES
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having operated under both arrangements). In finding an unprofessional
and illegal practice the court stated, "... petitioners must be held accountable for the practices which existed during the period that they were
charged with misconduct. '1 4 This statement appears to have reference to
the period in which the attorney operated under the "fee-splitting" contracts.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in the instant case, concluded that the
legitimate interest of the Brotherhood does justify the conducting of investigations, and a staff, financed by the Brotherhood, may be maintained
to accomplish this purpose. The investigations may be conducted with a
view towards subsequent litigation, but the resulting reports must be
given to the injured or his kin.
Further, the court asserted that the Brotherhood may make known to
all its members, and specifically to those injured, the advisability of obtaining legal advice prior to a settlement and the names of attorneys who,
in the opinion of the Brotherhood, can handle such claims successfully.
However, the court also held that the Brotherhood may not permit investigators to carry the attorneys' contracts or photostats of prior settlement
checks, fix the fees of the attorneys, or maintain any financial connection
with the attorneys.
The Illinois Supreme Court did not take disciplinary action against the
attorneys of the Brotherhood 15 because of the ambiguity resulting from
the Ryan case.' 6 Upon the same basis, the Brotherhood was given until
July 1, 1959 to reorganize in accordance with the recommendations set
forth in the opinion.
14 Ibid., at 514, 514.

15 Ibid. The California court did not take disciplinary action against Hildebrand.
16 The rationale for refusing to discipline was based on In re Luster, 12 IU1.2d 25,
145 NE.2d 75 (1957), where the court permitted an attorney to use as an equitable

defense his reliance on an unreported case never expressly overruled, notwithstanding
similar contra opinions.

NEGLIGENCE-INSURER HELD LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT ISSUANCE OF POLICY TO ONE WITH NO INSURABLE INTEREST WHO SUBSEQUENTLY MURDERED INSURED
Appellee, father of a deceased minor child, sued appellants, Liberty
National Life Ins. Co., National Life and Accident Ins. Co., and Southern
Life and Health Ins. Co., for the wrongful death of the child. The father
based his suit upon the theory that the insurers were negligent in issuing
policies of life insurance to the beneficiary, an aunt-in-law, who was
subsequently convicted of the murder of the child. The Supreme Court
of Alabama upheld the judgment of $75,000 on the ground that the evi-
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dence presented questions for the jury. Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v.
Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696 (Ala., 1958)
In a lengthy but logical discourse on the various aspects of the law
involved in this case, the court arrived at the conclusion that an insurance
company which negligently issues a life insurance policy on a life, to one
who has no insurable interest in the life, is liable for the injuries to the
insured as a result of this negligence.
In looking at this problem the court explained the pertinent issues in
regard to insurable interest and negligence. To arrive at a better understanding of the rule announced, it is necessary to view each of these
aspects separate and apart from the instant case.
Illinois courts have held that it is essential for the validity of an insurance policy, that the party taking the insurance have an insurable interest
in the subject matter of the insurance,' and policies so issued without this
requisite insurable interest are void as against public policy.2 In the words
of Justice Field in Warnock v. Davis:
[I]n all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations

of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect
some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured.
Otherwise the contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking the policy
is directly interested in the early death of the assured. Such policies have a
tendency to create a desire for the event. They are, therefore, independently
5

of any statute on the subject, condemned as being against public policy.

In the instant case, the court states Alabama public policy in equally
4
strong language, quoting from Helmetag's Adm'r. v. Miller:
The reason of the law which vitiates wager policies, is the pecuniary interest
which the holder has in procuring the death of the subject of insurance, thus
opening a wide door by which a constant
temptation is created to commit for
5
profit the most atrocious of crimes.

It is seen that in the instant case, the policies issued to the aunt-in-law
would be void as against public policy, if it was found that the aunt-in-law
1 Patterson

v. Durand Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 303 Ill. App. 128, 24 N.E.2d 740 (1940).

Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775 (1881); Helmetag's Adm'r. v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183
(1884); Mutual Aid Union v. White, 166 Ark. 467, 267 S.W. 137 (1924); Wilson v. Pro2

gressive Life Ins. Co., 61 Ga. 617, 7 S.E.2d 44 (1940); Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Hogan, 80 111. 35 (1875); Shaw v. Livingston & Co., 293 Ky. 575, 169 S.W.2d 612 (1943);
Evans v. Independent Nat. Life Ins. Co., 148 So. 264 (1933); Woods v. Washington
Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 113 S.W.2d 121 (1938); Wharton v. Home Security Life Ins. Co.,
206 N.C. 254, 173 S.E. 338 (1934); Henderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 176 S.C. 100,
179 S.E. 680 (1935); Washington v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 175 Tenn. 529, 136 S.W.2d

493 (1940).
3 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881).

4 76 Ala. 183, 187 (1884).

6 Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So.2d 696, 705 (Ala., 1958).
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lacked sufficient insurable interest in the life of the deceased child. The
court dismissed a discussion of pecuniary interest for the evidence tended
to show that the aunt-in-law had no ". . . reasonable expectation of possible profit or advantage to her from the continued life of Shirley."6 By
virtue of the holdings in two Alabama cases, Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.
v. George7 and National Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Middlebrook,8 the
court in the instant case resolved the question of insurable interest by
blood or affinity. In the former case it was held that in Alabama, the relation of aunt alone, without other circumstances, is not sufficient to sustain an insurable interest. The latter case stands for the proposition that
Alabama courts do not recognize an in-law relationship alone as sufficient
to sustain an insurable interest.
Following the Alabama decisions, the majority of jurisdictions recognize an insurable interest by virtue of blood relation alone where there is
the relation of parent and child, grandparent and grandchild and brother
and sister. Usually the courts only hold the relation of husband and wife
as sufficient when speaking of affinity. 9 Other relations, such as uncle and
aunt, nieces and nephews, and that of cousins, have not been recognized
by the courts as sufficient to uphold an insurable interest without some
other attendant circumstances. 10
Illinois courts have put an even stricter interpretation upon insurable
interest. They state, in summary, that besides the relationship of husband
and wife and certain aspects of parent and child, there must be some economic or pecuniary advantage in order to support an insurable interest."
Thus satisfying itself with the absence of an insurable interest by the
aunt-in-law in the life of the deceased child, the court moved into the area
of the negligent issuance of these void policies.
Following the academic theory for finding the components of a cause
of action in negligence, the court in the instant case first discussed duty;
then breach of the duty; and finally proximate cause. Using cases which
dealt with other than insurance matters, 12 the court based its finding on
6 Ibid., at 104. See Helmetag's Adm'r. v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (1884); Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co. v. George, 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910 (1947).
7 248 Ala. 649, 28 So. 2d 910 (1947).
8 27 Ala. App. 247, 170 So. 84 (1936).

944 CJ.S., Insurance §5 204, 205 (1945); Vance, Insurance § 31, pages 183 to 199 incl.
(3rd ed., 1951).
10 Ibid.
App. 649 (1897). But see: Guardian
11 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Quandt,69 I11.
386, 85
35 (1875); and, Schwerdt v.Schwerdt, 235 Ill.
M. L. Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill.
N.E. 613 (1908).
12 Weston v. National Manufacturers & Stores Corp., 253 Ala. 503, 45 So. 2d 459
(1950) (sales contract); Railway Express Co. v. Real, 253 Ala. 489, 45 So. 2d 306
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the broad statement that there is a duty upon all to exercise reasonable
care not to injure another. 13 The breach of this duty of the insurance companies to take reasonable steps so as not to cause injury to the insured was
evident by a perusal of the facts. It was shown that the appellants made no
effort to inquire into the actual presence or absence of an insurable interest
in the aunt-in-law. The component of this negligence action which posed
the greatest problem was whether the insurance companies could be held
liable for this negligence, not withstanding the fact that an intervening
cause, the criminal act of murder by the aunt-in-law, was actually in point
of time, the cause of the death of the insured child.
The appellants cited the case of Garrett v. Louisville and Nashville R.
Co. 14 for the proposition that the intervening criminal act breaks the
chain of causation and therefore appellants would not be liable. The court
was not impressed with this case, as authority, since there was no question
of foreseeability in the Garrett case.
Kettman v. Levine' concisely pinpoints the problem in the instant case
with the statement: "The question of proximate cause is a question of foreseeability." Similar statements have been found in many other cases, too
numerous to mention.
The court in the instant case stated that the appellants were duty bound
to anticipate the possibility of the very act which here occurred; and this
duty comes directly from the vigorous tenor of the language found in the
cases in respect to such insurance contracts being held void as against public policy. 16 As stated above, Alabama has found such insurance contracts
void because of ". . . the pecuniary interest which the holder has in pro17
curing the death of the subject of insurance."
The negligence of the' appellants is the proximate cause of the death of
the insured, because by public policy, appellants were held to foresee or
should have foreseen, as reasonable men, the very action which the public
policy roundly condemns; in this case the intervening criminal act of
murder.
Many cases have held that intervening negligent acts do not break the
(1950) (truck); Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Callahan, 244 Ala. 449, 13 So. 2d 660

(1943)

(common carriers); Whiddon v. Malone, 220 Ala. 220, 124 So. 516 (1929)

(auto); Merchant's Bank v. Sherman, 215 Ala. 370, 110 So. 805 (1926) (sales warranty);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Arnold, 162 Ala. 570, 50 So. 293 (1909) (railway).
18 Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 100 So. 2d 696, 708 (Ala., 1958).
14 196 Ala. 52, 71 So. 685 (1916).
15 115 Cal. App. 2d 844, 253 P. 2d 102 (1953).

16 See Helmetag's Adm'r. v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (1884).
17 Ibid., at 187.
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chain of causation. But, in Werkman v. Howard Zink Corp. the following statement is found:
Foreseeability in causation means foreseeability of intervening causes only; it

does not include foreseeability of consequences. A consequence which follows
directly either from defendant's act or from a foreseeably caused intervening
act is proximate.' 8

In Illinois, the case of Libby, McNeill and Libby v. Illinois District
Telephone Co., although holding upon the facts that there was no foreseeability, stated:
Defendant's negligence is too remote to constitute the proximate cause where

an independent illegal act of a third person, which could not reasonably have
been foreseen, and without which such injury would not have been sustained,
intervenes. A person is not bound to anticipate the malicious or criminal acts
of others by which damage is inflicted, even though they are the acts of children. But where an independent illegal act was of a nature which might have
been anticipated and which it was the defendant's duty to provide against, he
will be liable for breach of such duty not-withstanding the production of injuries by the intervention of an act of the character described. 19

Alabama, by this decision, holds, that insurance companies are liable to
insured persons for injuries which result from the impetus given buyers of
the insurance who have no insurable interest, to commit acts which public
policy condemns and which by virtue of this same public policy, the insurance companies are bound to foresee. With the use of reasoning similar to
that used by the Alabama court in the instant case, the majority of courts
which hold such insurance contracts void as against public policy (including Illinois whose public policy is much more vigorous in its condemnation) may very well hold insurance companies liable under similar factual
arrangements.
18 97 Cal. 2d 418, 218 P. 2d 43, 48 (1950). See also, Watson v. Southern Bus Lines, 186
F. 2d 981 (C.A. 6th, 1951); Di Gironimo v. American Seed Co., 96 F. Supp. 795 (E.D.
Pa., 1951); Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 249 P. 2d 257 (1952); De La Torre v. Valenzuela, 102 Cal. App. 2d 586, 228 P. 2d 13 (1951).

19 249 Ill. App. 93, 13 N.E. 2d 683 (1938) (emphasis supplied).

TAXATION-LIABILITY OF BENEFICIARY OF LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY FOR UNPAID TAXES
OF DECEDENT DETERMINED
Two recent Supreme Court cases have finally settled the question of
liability of the beneficiary of a life insurance policy for the unpaid income
taxes of the decedent.
In the first case, the decedent was a resident of Kentucky. Six years
after his death the Tax Court held that he had been deficient in his income

